

TALKING PAPER

ON

PREDATOR

Predator problems are many, varied, and can only be solved over a reasonable period of time, with additional resources of money, manpower, and CSAF involvement to resolve political/doctrinal issues with the Army and Navy.

Problem Summary

Political

The Army ran the original Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) and were not happy about losing this program. I believe that their political agenda is to prove that the USAF cannot properly support their ground commanders and possibly regain control the Predator program or restore funding to their failed Hunter program. (Atch 1)

The 1st Infantry Division, Tuzla, is keeping a daily detailed record of Predator support/non-support (Atch 2).

The Contractor, General Atomics and its' CEO RADM Tom Cassidy (Ret) have strong and personal support through Congressmen Jerry Lewis and Duke Cunningham and their staffs.

The Navy has direct control of the program through the Joint Program Office (JPO). I believe that they desire to have total control of the program.

The other players: DARO, JPO, SAF/AQ, Navy PMA, DARPA, ACC, EUCOM, USAFE, 16AF, 57FW, and 11RS. Each are involved in the decision process.

Operational

Moving from an ACTD to limited operational status was pre-mature and is the fundamental root to the Predator problem. Though Predator has provided some excellent capability to US/NATO commanders in Bosnia, this has been done at the expense of the orderly transition from ACTD to a proper initial operational capability. Over aggressive marketing has lead to an unrealistic expectation of this ACTD system, especially in the harsh weather environment of the Bosnian Theater of operations and resulted in the frustration of all involved.

28 April 1997

Operational (continued)

Ongoing 11RS operation in Taszar, Hungary has strained the system and personnel to the breaking point. I was very impressed that the 11RS personnel have maintained an outstanding attitude in spite of TDY rates of over 200 days and living in the harsh tent city environment of Taszar with 2000 Army troops.

Exploitation of Predator data through the Global Broadcast System (GBS) is good, but we must work on getting Predator data into AFMSS, CIS, and PowerScene.

The contractor has also performed extremely well under these harsh conditions along with haphazard contracting support and funding. As long as operations in Taszar are maintained, Predator problems will continue.

Weather

One mission in 27 Days Dec-Jan 97

Problem: Winds, Icing, Rain, Cloud Cover, Low Ceilings, and a Single Base of Operations

Winter operations in Bosnia are not practical. It only complicates high Army expectations and frustrations.

Basing

There is no good solution to the basing situation. Of the multiple options, Taszar with all of its limitations is the only practical solution.

Logistics/Maintenance

"Broken." Only due to the extraordinary efforts of dedicated "Blue-Suiters" and contractors is the Predator flying at all. We must institutionalize this into the formal USAF system.

Recommendations

- CSAF hold a frank discussion with the Army Chief of Staff to diffuse the doctrinal and control issues with the Army. Predator will never support the tactical commander until the USAF and USA resolves the political issues.
- CSAF hold a frank discussion with RADM Cassidy (Ret) to properly focus Congressional support and Contractor relationship with the Government.
- CSAF visit Predator operations in Taszar and Indian Springs.

Recommendations (continued)

- Complete program management must be transferred to the USAF. The JPO, in its' current configuration, has only added to the problem.
- We cannot task the 11RS with additional tasking until the appropriate training, personnel, equipment, documentation, contracts, and supply systems are in place. This will require additional funding.
- 11RS personnel receive no tax break for Taszar TDY deployments, this should be corrected.

Summary

Predator has an excellent capability and when weather permits, commanders are very impressed with its' capabilities. The Predator program has clearly demonstrated that ACTD can clearly expedite the acquisition process, but there must be sufficient time and resources committed to properly mature an ACTD prototype into an operational and supportable capability. If for political reasons we must continue our Taszar deployment, we will be forced to accept, with minor modifications, the current Predator configuration as the initial production. This might not fully meet our stated system requirements. I have prepared a more detailed report and briefing for you.

3 Attachments

1. Article from Inside the Army
2. 1st Infantry Division Predator Log
3. Photographs

Inside the Pentagon's

Inside the Army

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Vol. 9, No. 8, February 24, 1997

U.S. cost avoidance of \$140M possible**TOP PENTAGON OFFICIAL APPROVES PLANS FOR COOPERATIVE FSCS DEVELOPMENT**

The Pentagon's top acquisition official has approved the Army's nascent plans to cooperatively develop and procure a future scout vehicle with the United Kingdom, according to service officials and documents.

Paul Kaminski, under secretary of defense for acquisition and technology, last month indicated his support for the effort and has "approved [a] U.S. negotiation position" for entering into a memorandum of agreement with the British, according to Army documents.

A cooperative program promises savings for both countries: estimated U.S. cost avoidance for a future scout vehicle during engineering and manufacturing development is \$130 million to \$140 million, or 30 percent to 40

*continued on page 8*Service adds funding in last-minute budget move**LINE-OF-SIGHT MISSILE PROGRAM DODGES TERMINATION AS ARMY PLANS '98 ACTD**

After narrowly escaping termination at the hands of the Pentagon comptroller late last year, the Army's Line-of-Sight Anti-Tank program may be healthier than ever with a new demonstration planned, a new platform, and additional funding.

LOSAT appeared dead and buried following a program budget decision issued last year by the comptroller (*Inside the Army*, Nov. 25, 1996, p1). The PBD directed the service to either fully fund the effort or kill it, and initially it appeared as though the termination alternative would hold.

But fully fund means different things to different people, and a compromise was worked out: LOSAT will be

*continued on page 9*With viability of Outrider questioned . . .**KAMINSKI REQUESTS OPTIONS FOR FIELDING ADDITIONAL HUNTER UAVs TO ARMY**

The Pentagon's top acquisition official last week requested information on options for fielding additional Hunter unmanned aerial vehicle systems to warfighting units, according to military and industry officials.

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Paul Kaminski sought the Hunter briefing amid growing concern over the viability of the Outrider tactical UAV system, now in development (*Inside the Army*, Feb. 10, p1).

Pentagon sources say Hunter is being considered as an interim solution to commanders' needs for a tactical UAV, and that the Defense Department has no intentions of procuring more of the short-range drones.

continued on page 10\$17.7 million on hold by OSD**DECKER: CARGO HELICOPTER FUNDS NEEDED TO AVOID DELAYS, COST INCREASES**

The Army's Improved Cargo Helicopter program could be delayed two years and may face increased program costs if the Office of Secretary of Defense does not release fiscal year 1997 funds Congress added for the program, according to Gil Decker, the service's top acquisition official.

Decker, assistant secretary of the army for research, development and acquisition, requested the release of the \$17.7 million in a Feb. 13 memorandum to Paul Kaminski, under secretary of defense for acquisition and technology. The memo was obtained by *Inside the Army*.

According to the letter, the ICH program has yet to enter formal phases of the acquisition process but FY-96

*continued on page 11***Paneling**

The National Defense Panel will commence work analyzing the conduct of the Quadrennial Defense Review at its first meeting this Thursday, Feb. 27. Adm. David Jeremiah (ret.), former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a member of the NDP, told *Inside the Army* last week panel chairman Philip Odeen has called the Thursday meeting, following initial conversations with QDR officials and various congressional delegations. Jeremiah said the question of whether or not the NDP, which was delayed more than two months from its congressionally mandated stand-up date, would be able to meet its March 12 deadline for an initial report on the QDR process "depends upon the level of detail" the group seeks to achieve.

Wheeled Vehicle.

Program officials explain the switch is not a tremendous challenge, but will involve a more "robust" missile because the humvee does not have a turret, as did the AGS. Accordingly, the missile must be able to "turn much quicker to be able to address targets that are not directly in front of the vehicle," a program official said. "We have a much bigger 'fan' now that we can engage targets in, and once we get outside that fan, we would of course have to reposition the humvee to address the target." -- Daniel G. Dupont

HUNTER MAY GET ITS DAY IN THE SUN . . . begins on page one

This request would appear to signify a major shift by the Pentagon leadership on the short-range Hunter program, which Kaminski last year all but terminated. Following a recommendation by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to eliminate the Hunter program, Kaminski allowed the procurement contract to expire after the Defense Department purchased seven systems (*Inside the Army*, Feb. 5, 1996, p6).

While Kaminski provided for the fielding of a single system to develop UAV tactics and procedures, and part of a system for training, the remaining new systems were put into storage.

Perhaps not for long. Pentagon sources say Maj. Gen. Kenneth Israel, director of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, which has oversight of UAVs, is compiling a brief with options for fielding a "reduced footprint" version of Hunter.

An entire Hunter system -- comprising eight air vehicles and numerous attendant ground components -- was designed to be fielded as a corps asset. Industry and Pentagon officials say Israel will present options that include packaging Hunter with fewer air vehicles and ground systems that could be fielded to divisions.

Kaminski has made this inquiry of his own volition, without any prodding from the Army, sources say.

In fact, Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald Griffith and Army Acquisition Executive Gil Decker had an extensive meeting on the issue of additional Hunter fieldings on Feb. 14, but sources say the leadership did not change its position: No decision on additional fielding will be made until after the Task Force XXI exercise next month.

While the Army has for years been working to field a UAV system to its tactical commanders, the service leadership agreed to Hunter's termination with the understanding that two other UAV systems would pick up Hunter's short-range mission: the medium-altitude endurance Predator, and the tactical Outrider.

A year after that decision, however, many service officials believe evidence is surfacing that Army commanders won't get what they need from Predator or Ourider.

Two things have given Army officials pause regarding Predator support in the last year: the Bosnia mission and a doctrinal debate with the Air Force over control of the reconnaissance drone. Because it is owned and operated by the Air Force, Army commanders do not have direct control over Predator, even when it flies missions they request.

In Bosnia, many Army officials complained the Predator was not responsive to needs of the 1st Armored Division, but failed to document how, senior service officials said last month (see related story). In the end Army commanders requested a UAV system designed to provide tactical support. While many officials thought Hunter would be deployed, the older Navy-owned Pioneer was sent.

Last summer, the Air Force staunchly objected to a provision in a draft concept of operations for Predator that would allow tactical commanders at the division and corps level to operate both the UAV's payload and air vehicle when flying in support of that commander (*Inside the Army*, Aug. 19, 1996, p1).

While Chief of Staff Gen. Dennis Reimer chose not to lock horns with the Air Force on this matter in hopes the issue would surface in the Joint Staff, senior service officials maintain the Army needs a forward control element for Predator.

GRIFFITH: PREDATOR NOT RESPONSIVE TO TACTICAL COMMANDERS IN BOSNIA

Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald Griffith has put voice to what Army officials have grumbled about off the record for months: the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle was not responsive to the needs of tactical commanders during the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. Griffith addressed the issue during a functional area assessment of military intelligence last December, and his comments were noted in a Jan. 29 message to the field on the results of that meeting.

"VCSA noted that Predator support to the 1st Armored Division was less than satisfactory, but that the Army failed to properly document this," states the message, obtained by *Inside the Army*.

Assistant Vice Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, also in attendance, suggested the Army's military intelligence community should clearly articulate its requirements for Predator and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System to the Air Force "and then monitor the system support."

MARCH 1997 PREDATOR STATISTICS


TOTAL TARGETS SATISFIED	197
TOTAL PERCENT COVERED	67%
TARGETS LOST DUE TO WEATHER CANCELS	58
TARGETS LOST DUE TO MECHANICAL CANCELS	18
ASSET SUCCESS RATE	90%

*ASSET SUCCESS RATE = TOTL SAT / TOTL PLND - WX - MX

TOTAL TASK FORCE EAGLE RETASKINGS	5
TASK FORCE EAGLE RETASKINGS SATISFIED	5
TOTAL PERCENT TFE RETASKINGS SATISFIED	100%

DAYS NOT SCHEDULED TO SUPPORT TFE	2
SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE DOWN DAYS	2
DAYS PLANNED TO FLY IN SUPPORT OF TFE	12
WEATHER CANCELLED	2
MECHANICAL CANCELLED	1
TOTAL DAYS FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF TFE	9

BREAKDOWN OF TARGET COVERAGE FOR MARCH



BREAKDOWN OF DAYS IN MARCH

